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DEPARTMENT
OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BATTALION, 92D ARTILLERY
APO 96318
AVGG-BJ 5
May 1969
SUBJECT: Operational
Report of the 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery for Period Ending 30 April
1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)
See Distribution
1. (C) Section 1,
Operations: Significant Activities.
a. (C) General:
(1) The 1st Battalion,
92d Artillery remains attached to the 52d Artillery Group, I Field
Force Vietnam Artillery, with its headquarters at Pleiku, Republic
of Vietnam and its Forward Command Post in Dak To, Republic of Vietnam,
operating in general support of US/RVNAF and FWMAF. The organization
has been continuously engaged in action against hostile forces in
the Area of Operations Binh Tay - MacArthur, II Corps Tactical Zone,
Republic of Vietnam.
(2) Location, status
and mission of each unit organic to or OPCON to this battalion are
as follows:
(a) Forward Command
Post: Grid ZB003215 (Fire Support Base 1, Dak To); Organic; Coordinates
fire support for Dak To/Ben Het area, tactically controls organic
and OPCON units and tactically directs fires.
(b) Battalion
Headquarters: Grid ZA226535 (Artillery Hill, Pleiku); organic; General
Support.
(c) Battery A(-):
Grid ZA228838 (LZ Mary Lou, 5 KM south of Kontum) OPCON to 6th Battalion,
14th Artillery; General Support.
(d) Battery A
Platoon: Grid YB869256 (Fire Support Base 12, 15 KM west of Dak
To); Organic; General Support.
(e) Battery B:
Grid YB933188 (Fire Support Base 6, 7 KM west of Dak To); Organic;
General Support.
(f) Battery C:
Grid ZA226535 (Artillery Hill, Pleiku) OPCON to 3d Battalion, 6th
Artillery; General Support.
(g) Service Battery:
Grid ZA226535 (Artillery Hill, Pleiku) Organic: General Support.
(h) Battery A,
3d Battalion, 6th Artillery: Grid ZB005216 (Fire Support Base 1,
Dak To); OPCON to 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery; General Support.
(i) Battery B(-),
6th Battalion, 14th Artillery: Grid YB869256 (Fire Support Base
12, 15 KM northwest of Dak To); OPCON 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery;
General Support.
(j) Battery B
Platoon (1 Gun), 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery: Grid ZB005216 (Fire
Support Base 1, Dak To); OPCON 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery; General
Support.
(k) 2d Platoon(-),
Battery B, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AW): Grid ZB005216 (Fire
Support Base 1, Dak To); Direct Support 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery,
Dak To.
(l) 2 Dusters
(11&31), 2d Platoon, Battery B, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery
(AW) Grid YB869256 Fire Support Base 12, 15 KM northwest of Dak
To); Direct Support, Battery B, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (which
is OPCON to 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery).
(m) Metro Section:
ZA005217 (Fire Support Base 1, Dak To); Organic; Supports Artillery
and Air Weather Service in Dak To/Ben Het area.
(n) 254th Radar
Detachment: Grid YB869256 (Fire Support Base 12, 15KM northwest
of Dak To); OPCON to 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery; provides counter
mortar surveillance for the Dak To/Ben Het area.
(3) The battalion
is organized under the provisions of TO&E 6-425G, dated 31 October
1966, as modified by MTO&E 6-425G dated 13 November 1968. The
battalion strength is:
OFF
WO EM TOTAL
(a) Authorized 37 6 555 598
(b) Assigned 35 5 545 585
(4) There were
20 personnel in the Battalion wounded during the reporting period.
Of these 2 were from Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 4 from
Battery A, 12 from Battery C, and 2 from Service Battery. Also the
battalion had one man KIA when SP4 Jeffrey T. Cassidy, Service Battery,,
1st Battalion, 92d Artillery was killed by hostile incoming mortar
fire at LZ Swinger YB837966 (64 KM northwest of Kontum).
b. Intelligence:
(1) Observation.
(a) One forward
observer party was provided to support 23d Ranger Battalion (ARVN)
operation Binh Tay 50 during the period 28 January 1969 through 7
February 1969. The operation was conducted approximately 30 KM northwest
of Pleiku.
(b) Forward observer
parties were provided to three different units during one month period
beginning the middle of February to the middle of March. The first
operation was with the 11th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) which operated
southwest of Pleiku. The second operation was with the 111th Mobile
Strike Force Company which operated south of Ben Het. The third operation
was conducted with the 4th Mobile Strike Force Battalion which operated
to the west of Ben Het.
(c) One forward
observer party was provided to the 42d ARVN Regiment to support an
operation 19 KM east of Dak To. The operation began on 19 March 1969
and terminated on 22 March 1969. On 23 March 1969, this same forward
observer party accompanied the 42d ARVN Regiment on an operation 9
KM north of Dak To.
(d) One forward
observer party was provided to the Mobile Strike Force at Ben Het
on 26 March 1969. On 5 April 1969 the forward observer party departed
Ben Het on the first of three combat operations in which they supported
the Mobile Strike Force elements.
(e) One forward
observer party was provided to the 42d ARVN Regiment for an operation
in the vicinity of Fire Support Base 21, located 19 KM northeast of
Dak To. Operation began 10 April 1969 and terminated 19 April 1969.
(g) One forward
observer party was provided to the Mobile Strike Force operation southwest
of Ben Het. The team was inserted on 15 April 1969. They are presently
still accompanying this operation.
(g) One forward
observer party was provided to the Mobile Strike Forces operating
in the Ben Het area on 20 April 1969. This team remains committed
with the Mobile Strike Force operation at this time.
c. (C) Operations
and Training Activities.
(1) Operations.
(a) Battery A, 1st
Battalion, 92d Artillery was located at the Rock Quarry (ZA064311,
25 KM southwest of Pleiku) in General Support and OPCON to 3d Battalion,
6th Artillery. The battery remained intact at this location until
10 March 1969 when three howitzers were road marched to Kon Horing
(ZB121162, 13 KM southeast of Dak To). Mission of the three displaced
howitzers was General Support with priority of fires to 24th STZ.
OPCON for these howitzers reverted to 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery.
The 42d ARVN Regiment
operation, which the three howitzers were supporting terminated on
16 March 1969, On that day, the three howitzers which had been at
Kon Horning were road marched to Fire Support Base 1 (YB004251, Dak
To) with the mission of General Support, priority of fires to 24th
STZ. These three howitzers were moved back to Kon Horning on 19 March
1969 to support another 24th STZ operation in an area 19 KM east of
Dak To. On the morning of 21 March 1969, Kon Horning was hit with
mortar, rocket and recoiless rifle fire. A ground attack was also
launched by enemy forces, "A" Battery fired direct fire
into the enemy positions as did the ARVN unit (platoon from A/221)
co-located on the same fire base. The enemy was repulsed due to the
direct firing of the howitzers and the courage and determination of
the 42d ARVN Regiment security forces. Enemy KIA were 11, by body
count. "A" Battery suffered 4 WIA. On 22 March 1969 the
remaining three howitzers from "A" Battery located at the
Rock Quarry were road marched to Kon Horning and the battery was once
again intact. OPCON for these three howitzers passed from the 3d Battalion,
6th Artillery to the 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery and the mission
was General Support with priority of fires to 24th STZ. Late in the
afternoon of 22 March 1969 upon termination of the operation, the
battery displaced from Kon Horning and road marched to FSB 1 (Dak
To). The mission of "A" Battery remained General Support
with priority of fires to 24th STZ. On 24 March 1969, "A"
Battery(-) with four howitzers displaced from Dak To to Tri Dao (ZB156057,
19 KM northwest of Kontum). OPCON passed from 1st Battalion 92d Artillery
to 6th battalion, 14th Artillery. Mission for "A" Battery(-)
was General Support, priority of fires to 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry
Division. The platoon remaining at Dak To retained its original mission.
On 28 March 1969, the platoon at Dak To road marched to Ben Het and
began constructing bunkers around the howitzers with overhead cover.
The mission of these two howitzers was General Support, with priority
of fires to counter-battery missions in defense of Ben Het. The fortifications
which house these howitzers were so constructed that the howitzers
will fire only between azimuths 4000 mils and 4900 mils. The platoon
has remained at Ben Het from 28 March 1969 until the closing date
of this report. On 11 April 1969, Battery A(-) which had been at Tri
Dao displaced from that location by road march to Fire Support Base
1 (Dak To). This move was necessitated by Battery A, 4th Battalion,
42d Artillery being extracted on 11 April l969 from Fire Support Base
34 in the Dak To area, thereby leaving Battery B, 1st, Battalion 92d
Artillery on Fire Support Base 6 (YB933l88, 7 KM west of Dak To) without
mutual medium or light artillery support. Upon closure at Dak To,
OPCON passed from 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery to 1st Battalion,
92d Artillery with a mission of General Support, priority of fires
to 24th STZ. On 15 April 1969, Battery A (-) located at Dak To, road
marched to LZ Nary Lou (ZA228838, 10 KM south of Kontum). OPCON passed
to 6th Battalion 14th Artillery upon closing at LZ Nary Lou. The mission
was General Support. The next day, 16 April l969, the battery (minus)
continued to road march to LZ Bass (ZA029933, 23 KM west of Kontum).
Upon arriving at LZ Bass the Battery (minus) conducted an air movement
to Fire Support Base Impossible (YA836747, 45 KM southwest of Kontum).
The battery (minus) closed at Fire Base Impossible on 16 April l969.
It remained there from that date until 27 April 1969 when the battery
began moving by air to LZ Bass and subsequently by vehicle to LZ Mary
Lou their present location at the end of this reporting period.
(b) Battery B, 1st
Battalion, 92d Artillery was located at Fire Support Base 6 (YB933188,
7 KM west of Dak To) in General Support, organic to the 1st Battalion,
92d Artillery. The battery remained intact at that location until
10 April 1969, when a two howitzer platoon was air lifted to Fire
Support Base 7 (ZB060267, 7 KM northeast of Dak To) to support a 42d
ARVN Regiment operation and to provide mutual support for two ARVN
105mm howitzers at Fire Support Base 21 (ZB138537, 19 Km northeast
of Dak To). The platoon remained at Fire Support Base 7 until the
42d ARVN operation terminated on 19 April 1969. On 21 April 1969,
the platoon was airlifted back to Fire Support Base 6. Since that
time, the battery has been intact on Fire Support Base 6. During this
reporting period, one of the most significant actions in which "B"
Battery participated was the defense of Ben Het Special Forces Camp
on the night of 3-4 March 1969. On that night, the Ben Het Special
Forces Camp was attacked by an estimated NVA Battalion reinforced
with Soviet-built PT76 amphibious tanks. "B" Battery fired
timely and accurate artillery fire around the camp and on targets
of opportunity as they were requested by ground observers. Artillery
fire, forming a "wall of steel" around the camp prevented
the enemy from reaching the outer perimeter of wire. "B"
Battery expended a total of 582 high explosive rounds and 172 Improved
Conventional Munitions continuously throughout the night. This was
part of a total expenditure of approximately 2000 rounds fired in
conjunction with light artillery. Total enemy damage during the attack
included two tanks destroyed and two vehicles destroyed.
(c) Battery C, 1st
Battalion, 92d Artillery was located at Fire Support Base Impossible
(YB835747, 45 KM southwest of Kontum: OPCON to 6th Battalion, 14th
Artillery with mission of General Support of 24th STZ operation. On
11 February 1969, the battery moved by air to LZ Bobbie (ZA062738)
with OPCON remaining with 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery. The mission
at LZ Bobbie was General Support priortiy of fires to the 3d Brigade
initially and later to 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. On 28th
February 1969, the battery moved by road to LZ Mary Lou (ZA228838,
10 KM south of Kontum) and from there immediately to LZ Bass ZA029932,
23 KM west of Kontum). Approximately one half of this road march was
conducted during the hours of darkness. From LZ Bass, the battery
was air lifted to LZ Swinger (YA837699, 23 KM west of Kontum) where
it was in General Support, priority of fires to the 1st Brigade, 4th
Infantry Division. On 14 April 1969 the battery airlifted fro LZ Swinger
to Fire Support Base 1, (ZB005216, Dak To). Upon closing at Fire Base
1, OPCON reverted from 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery to 1st Battalion,
92d Artillery. The mission of the battery was General Support, priority
of fires to 24th STZ. On 24th April 1969, the battery conducted a
road march to Pleiku, where OPCON passed to 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery.
The move to and occupation of LZ Swinger proved to be a significant
period of action. It was considered to be a "hot LZ". A
Company, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
air lifted into Swinger. The battle that followed left 30 enemy dead
while the company had one KIA and 14 WIA. On 2 March 1969 the last
of Battery C equipment arrived at LZ Swinger. ON 3 March 1969 the
first rounds of enemy artillery fire hit LZ Swinger. The enemy continued
to fire at LZ Swinger at various intervals for the remainder of the
time that the battery was on the Fire Support Base. The battery was
on LZ Swinger for 45 days, 32 of these days the battery received enemy
incoming rounds. A breakdown of enemy rounds received is as follows:
105mm 78 rounds; 75mm recoiless rifle, 41 rounds; 82mm mortar, 70
rounds; 85mm mortar, 3 rounds; and 60mm mortar, 4 rounds for a total
of 196 rounds of enemy fire. In response to the incoming Battery C
fired a total of 528 high explosive rounds, 145 Improved Conventional
Munitions and 39 white phosphorous rounds in counterbattery programs.
On 25 March 1969, a PPS counter personnel radar belonging to 3/8 Infantry
was emplaced on LZ Swinger. The battery employed the PPS radar on
the 27th, 28th and 29th of March 1969 firing a total of 103 high explosive
rounds, 24 Improved Conventional Munitions and 3 white phosphorous
rounds against targets obtained by use of the radar. While in General
Support of the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division in the Plei Trap
Valley, Battery C fired a total of 10,113 rounds. While there on LZ
Swinger the only way to get supplies to the battery was by airlift.
It became apparent that the enemy was trying to hit the resupply helicopters
as they approached and landed at the LZ. In answer to this, the battery
would fire countermortar and counterbattery programs while the helicopters
were unloading their cargo. As a result of this no helicopters were
seriously damaged while resupplying the battery.
(d) During the month
of February 1969, the 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery established a Fire
Support Coordination Center in its Forward CP at Dak To. This FSCC
was CO-located with the 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division Tactical
CP. An ARVN liaison officer was provided from the nearby 42d ARVN
Regiment. The functions of the 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery Forward
CP are to coordinate all available fire support for US, RVNAF and
other Free World Military Assistance Forces in its area of responsibility
(Dak To and Dak Sut Districts of Kontum Province). In addition, the
tactical operations of all US organic and OPCON artillery targeting,
fire support planning, clearing of all fires, tactical fire direction,
tactical employment of US artillery units, broadcasting air advisories
and coordination of logistical support for fire support bases in the
Dak To/Ben Het area. Continuous coordination is maintained with 24th
STZ, 42d ARVN Regiment, Ben Het Special Forces Camp, Dak Pek Special
Forces Camp, Dak Seang Special Forces Camp, 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry
Division, Dak To Subsector and all US or RVNAF tactical or Special
Forces operating within the range capabilities of the artillery controlled
by the 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery. Special artillery missions that
are coordinated by the Forward CP are referred to as the CORRAL program.
These are controlled fires that are normally directed by Headquarters,
I Field Force Artillery.
(e) At 2240 hours
on March 1969, a coordinated attack was launched against the Ben Het
Special Forces Camp by an estimated Battalion of NVA Infantry reinforced
by an estimated platoon of Soviet-built PT76 tanks. The attack began
at 2240 hours with a heavy barrage of enemy artillery. By 2300 hours,
the camp had received approximately 290 rounds of 85mm artillery in
addition to mortar and rocket fire. At 2305 hours a forward observer
on the west hill at Ben Het spotted 5 enemy tanks approaching his
position from the west along highway 512. Battery B, 1st Battalion,
92d Artillery, on Fire Support Base 6, was immediately directed to
fire Improved Conventional Munitions in the vicinity of the tanks
to neutralize any accompanying infantry or mine sweep teams. Shortly
thereafter, two of the tanks were destroyed when they ran into a mine
field. Illumination was fired by Battery B, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery
located on Fire Support Base 6. The illumination exposed the highway
which proved to be the main avenue of approach by the enemy into the
Ben Het area. High explosive, white phosphorous and Improved Conventional
Munitions were fired on the tanks and throughout the avenue of approach.
When it became obvious that the ground attack was continuing to advance
towards the perimeter, the artillery batteries on Fire Support Base
6 and Fire Support Base 34 were directed to fire defensive targets
around the camp. Final protective fires were adjusted close to the
perimeter wire. High explosive and Improved Conventional Munitions
were used and during the period when the attack was most intense,
a virtual "wall of steel" was placed around the camp by
artillery. Fires in depth were also fired to disrupt resupply, reinforcements
and attempts to recover bodies. By 0115 hours on 4 March 1969 the
ground attack had been halted by the massive artillery fire. Improved
Conventional Munitions concentrations, which had also been planned
on top of friendly positions in the event they were overrun, were
not fired. At 0126 hours, incoming diminished and the enemy began
withdrawing except for some probing and enveloping action from the
south. Continuous artillery fire was placed on all avenues of withdrawal
as well as around the perimeter until contact was completely broken.
Tactical emergency Class V resupply was accomplished to both Fire
Support Base 6 and 34 from 0200 hours to 0500 hours on 4 March 1969
using CH-47 Chinooks from the 179th Helicopter Company. Total expenditures
in defense of Ben Het from supporting artillery bases controlled by
the 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery FSCC were as follows:
B/1/92 582
HE 172 ICM 19 ILL
A/4/42 1685 HE 115 ICM 1
ILL
The close and continuous
coordination of all available artillery, integrated with AC 47 (Spooky)
and air strikes which arrived later in the attack, permitted massing
and maneuvering of fire support to defeat the enemy.
(f) During the period
19 March 1969, a liaison section was deployed with the 42d ARVN Regiment
practical CP to coordinate artillery fires for a 24th STZ operation
which was conducted 19 KM east of Dak To.
(g) At 270200 February
1969 the base camp at Artillery Hill (ZA226535) received a stand off
attack of approximately 27 rounds of 82mm mortar. Minor damage was
done to vehicles in the motor pool with the exception of one POL pod
that received a direct hit. There was one man that was slightly wounded
during the attack. Cantonment buildings received light damage.
(h) Since 23 February
1969, Fire Support Base 12 at Ben Het has received over 1700 rounds
of incoming artillery, mortar, rocket and recoiless rifle fire. Eight-five
(85) millimeter artillery fire has comprised the majority of this
incoming. The total number of 85mm rounds of incoming from 23 February
1969 through 30 April 1969 is 1,126 rounds. Most of these rounds have
been fired from artillery positions located in the Tri-Border area.
Several methods have been employed in delivering accurate counterbattery
fires on these positions. During the day, observation aircraft (0-1)
have proved to be the most effective means for locating the enemy
artillery pieces. The white smoke from the muzzle blast is easy to
spot from the air. Many new locations have been spotted and artillery
pieces have actually been destroyed by having aerial observers adjusting
the fires on these positions. It has been observed that the enemy
artillery does not fire for long periods of time; however, this was
to the case when the incoming first began. Perhaps this is because
time is involved in getting the observation aircraft over the target
area and this time was all the enemy figured he had to fire before
he would be spotted. At night a flash base system is utilized to pin
point enemy artillery positions. Observation posts from Fire Support
Base 6 (YB933188) and 12 (YB869256) read azimuths to the center of
mass of enemy muzzle flash. Counterbattery fires are placed on the
coordinates of the intersection of these two azimuths. Since this
system was perfected incoming has not been received during the hours
of darkness.
(i) Fire Support
Base 6 (YB933188) has received two stand-off mortar attacks during
this reporting period. The first occurred on 29 March 1969. Four 82mm
incoming rounds were received from the vicinity of YB935189. Battery
A, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery, located on Fire Support Base 34,
fired a countermortar mission expending a total of 156 high explosive
rounds. The mortars were silenced. There were negative damage or casualties
on Fire Support Base 6 as a result of this attack. The second attack
occurred on 9 April 1969 when 27 rounds of 82mm mortar were received.
Suspect locations for the mortar positions were YB925165, YB934201
and YB916170. Both Battery B, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery and Battery
A, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery fired countermortar fires on these
suspect mortar locations.
(j) The following
assistance was provided during the reporting period in conjunction
with the ARVN assistance program:
(1) During the
time that Battery C, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery occupied Fire
Support Base Impossible, one platoon from the 1st Battalion, 37th
Artillery (ARVN) was CO-located with them. During this time, close
coordination of training and fire direction assistance was provided.
(2) During the
reporting period 65 RF/PF offensive operations were supported by
US Artillery under the control of the 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery.
(3) Defensive
targets were fired and reaction tests were conducted during the
reporting period.
(4) Radio communications
have been established with the Special Forces camps at Ben Het,
Dak Seang and Dak Pek. This has proved to be most beneficial in
assisting these camps with artillery support. Also liaison visits
have been accomplished to the above locations.
(5) Metro support
has been provided to the 37th Artillery (ARVN) during the reporting
period.
(6) Artillery
support has been provided to the 42d ARVN Regiment which is located
at Tan Canh. Communications have also been established between the
42d ARVN Regiment and the FSCC at Dak To, between 24th STZ and 2d
Brigade, 4th Infantry Division at Mary Lou and with II Corps Headquarters
in Pleiku.
(7) Forward observer
parties have been provided to accompany ARVN maneuver elements on
their operations.
(8) Combined artillery
operations were planned and conducted during the reporting period.
(9) Artillery
repair support has been provided to the howitzers located at the
Special Forces Camp at Dak Seang.
(2) Training.
(a) Several classes
have been conducted at Dak To to train personnel of the 299th Engineer
Battalion in the use of artillery fire to protect their road construction
parties. Practical application portions of the classes were conducted.
(b) Members of the
battalion presented air movement instruction to ARVN units during
the period 16 April to 19 April 1969. The classes were conducted in
Nha Trang and were very well received.
(c) On the job training
continued for personnel in all batteries during the quarter. Emphasis
was on maintenance, fire direction, crew drill and communications.
(d) A representative
from I Field Force Vietnam Artillery S-4, taught a three hour class
on generators to 20 EM on 23 April 1969.
(e) The battalion
had 9 officers attend FO School this quarter.
(f) The battalion
had 9 officers attend FDO School this quarter.
(g) The batteries
have regularly scheduled times that the men are taken to the rifle
range to check, zero, and familiarize themselves with their weapons.
(h) During the reporting
period newly arrived personnel ceased attending the orientation given
at 4th Infantry Division. On 8 April the Battalions, in conjunction
with 52d Artillery Group, started their own orientation program for
newly assigned personnel. This consists of a four day block of instruction
with classes taught by members of each battalion and 52d Artillery
Group.
d. (C) Logistics:
(1) Battery A moved
250 tons of supplies by helicopter in the Chu Pa Mountain area.
(2) Battery B moved
1078 tons of supplies by helicopter in the Dak To area.
(3) Battery C moved
429 tons of supplies by helicopter in the Plei Trap Valley area.
(4) The battalion
total for supplies moved by air is approximately 1832 tons.
(5) Projects accomplished
were:
(a) The old TOC
was torn down and the west end was rebuilt into a medical aid bunker.
(b) A water tower
was built to furnish potable water to the mess hall.
(c) A new grease
trap and sump were built for the mess hall.
(d) Portions of
the towers and trenchlines in the base camp area were rebuilt.
(e) In the forward
CP area walkways were built, shower facilities were expanded and general
cleaning of the area was conducted.
(6) Battery B continues
to rely on air movement of supplies to the fire base. The battery
has established a rear staging area with qualified rigging personnel
to insure that resupply is properly maintained. Battery A and C are
presently resupplied by convoy fro LZ Mary Lou and Pleiku respectively.
(7) Since this battalion
is the only 155mm (towed) battalion capable of being airlifted in
the 52d Artillery Group, it is frequently called upon to assist 52d
Artillery Group and other units in preparing equipment for air movement.
Among some of these items rigged and prepared for movement have been
radar equipment, ammunition, rations and barrier materials.
e. Civil Affairs.
The battalion surgeon
and personnel from Headquarters Battery continued to make Civil Affairs
and Medcap visits to villages in coordination with our associate ARVN
Battery, Battery A, 37th ARVN Battalion. There were 3 Medcap visits
during which 475 Vietnamese were helped, two-thirds were children.
General medical care was provided.
f. Personnel:
(1) Major Jack E.
Bonner was assigned to Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery
on 3 February 1969.
(2) Major James
J. McDevitt assumed the duties of Battalion S-3 on 19 March 1969.
(3) 4 February 1969:
Captain Thomas J. Gill replaced Major (then Captain) Michael B. Farmer
as Commander of Battery C. Major Farmer was reassigned to Headquarters,
I Field Force Vietnam Artillery.
(4) 27 April 1969:
Captain James R. Sterrett replaced Captain James K. Mawhorr as Commander
of Battery B. Captain Mawhorr was reassigned to Headquarters, 52d
Artillery Group.
(5) The battalion
lost through normal rotation or reassignment the services of eleven
officers during the reporting period.
(6) The battalion
received nine new officers during the reporting period.
(7) Personnel in
the battalion received 24 Bronze Star Medals (6 for Valor), 2 Air
Medals, 20 Army Commendation Medals (11 for Valor) and 21 Purple Hearts
during the reporting period.
g. Artillery:
(1) During the quarter,
elements of this battalion made a total of 18 tactical moves, of which
12 were by road and 6 by air.
(2) During the reporting
period the battalion fired 36,509 rounds in support of tactical and
pacification operations. In addition, the battalion controlled batteries
which fired 3613 rounds of light artillery and 9450 rounds of heavy
artillery.
(3) On 8 February
1969, Battery C, located at Fire Support Base Impossible (YA835747)
received a standoff attack consisting of 12 rounds of 75mm recoiless
rifle rounds. The battery fired 37 high explosive and 13 Improved
Conventional Munitions rounds on the recoiless rifle position (Grid
YA856678). Incoming ceased after the tenth counterbattery round was
fired. The Forward CP experienced an 82mm mortar attack on 23 February
1969. Battery B fired countermortar fires on the suspect mortar location.
During the period
23 February to 1 April 1969, the Ben Het Special Forces camp experienced
35 artillery/mortar/recoiless rifle attacks. During each attack Battery
B, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery has fired observation post suppressive
fires and/or counter mortar and counterbattery fire. Since arriving
at Ben Het o 28 March 1969, Battery A Platoon has also fired counterbattery
fire during each attack. Both Battery C and Battery A, 1st Battalion,
92d Artillery, when positioned at Dak To, fired observation post suppressive
fires each time that Ben Het received incoming rounds. On 21 March
1969 Battery A(minus) 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery located at Kon
Horning (ZB121162) received a rocket/mortar/recoiless rifle attack.
The howitzers fired direct fire into the enemy positions and helped
repel the attack.
h. Other: Visits by
General Officers and other VIP's.
(1) During the quarter
the battalion received 11 visits by VIP's.
(2) A list of visits
by VIP's is attached as Inclosure 2.
2. Lessons Learned:
Commander's observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:
a. Personnel: None
b. Operation: Speed
Jack.
(1) Observations:
When the 155mm howitzer (towed) was laid in a certain direction and
a mission was received which required shifting of trails, considerable
effort, time, manpower and space was required.
(2) Evaluation:
The 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery has eliminated this problem by using
a speed jack. This device is a locally fabricated pedestal which is
placed under the center of balance of the howitzer. It facilitates
rapid pivoting of the howitzer through 6400 mils in a minimum size
parapet.
(3) Recommendation:
Recommend that 155mm (towed) howitzer units employ the speed jack
insofar as it permits 6400 mil capacity with quick reaction time and
minimum crewmen and space.
c. Training: Flash
Base.
(1) Observation:
During a 4 week period of intensified enemy standoff artillery attacks,
it was very difficult to get an exact location of the enemy flat trajectory
85mm artillery pieces in order to deliver accurate counterbattery
fires.
(2) Evaluation:
In the vicinity of the target fire base which was receiving the incoming
artillery, there were two other friendly bases, located at distances
of 6 KM and 9 KM southeast of this base. All three bases were instructed
to set up and man observation posts around the clock. Aiming circles
were set up at each observation post and survey coordinates of each
observation post were sent to battalion Forward CP, where a 1:25000
flash chart was set up. All three observation posts were plotted with
azimuth indices. After preparations were made, the system was tested
by friendly units firing illumination into suspect enemy artillery
locations and all three observation posts reported azimuths to the
illumination rounds. After several practices, the three azimuths reported
from the observation posts, when plotted on the flash chart, intersected
at one point or in a small triangle. It was obvious that the system
was working well enough to give general locations of hostile artillery.
Approximately one week after this drill, incoming enemy artillery
began about 2300 hours, 20 March 1969. All three observation posts
began reporting azimuths to muzzle flashes in the suspect artillery
positions. Through communications between observation posts, azimuths
were obtained to the same muzzle flashes. Through intersecting the
azimuths reported, the enemy artillery positions were located with
sufficient accuracy to commence counterbattery fire by zone and deflection
sweep. In most cases the observation posts could not observe the muzzle
flashes directly, but azimuths were shot to the center of illuminated
haze. Since that date, the target fire base has received no incoming
artillery during the hours of darkness and very little incoming during
the daylight hours.
(3) Recommendation:
That observation posts be established at each batter location and
that a flash chart be set up at each controlling battalion with the
observation posts of all battery locations plotted thereon with azimuth
indices. Should any unit receive incoming rounds, the location from
where the rounds are being fired can be determined through intersecting
azimuths from the observation posts to the enemy muzzle flash/muzzle
smoke.
d. Intelligence: None.
e. Logistics: Lack
of means for fire base water supply and suppression of hostile fire
during resupply.
(1) Fire Base Water
Supply.
(a) Observations:
When occupying mountain top fire bases, all water is normally airlifted
into the fire base.
(b) Evaluations:
The large amount of water needed in a tropical climate makes water
the most critical resupply problem. Additionally the scarcity of aircraft
sometimes caused by other priority tactical missions makes it more
difficult to haul the trailers or blivets in order to refill them.
This problem has been greatly alleviated by hauling non potable water
in field expedient containers such as empty 155mm powder canisters.
Most medium artillery batteries have a large supply of these canisters.
(c) Recommendations:
That all personnel be aware of the need to discover feasible field
expedients for transporting water and other supplies and that artillery
units be particularly aware of the many uses of such water tight containers
as powder cannisters.
(2) Flak suppression
and countermortar fires during helicopter resupply.
(a) Observation:
Helicopters which are of critical importance in maintaining most fire
bases and are extremely vulnerable to enemy fire while taking off
and landing.
(b) Evaluation:
While occupying LZ Swinger (YA837966) it was found that whenever a
helicopter attempted to take off or land on the fire base the enemy
would deliver enemy mortar and recoiless rifle fire against the aircraft.
His tactic seriously threatened the fire base. This enemy tactic was
overcome by planning and delivering flak suppression and countermortar/recoiless
rifle fires whenever a helicopter was landing or taking off or sitting
on the pad.
(c) Recommendation:
The flak suppression and counter mortar and counter recoiless rifle
fire be planned around al fire bases which must be resupplied by air
and that these programs be constantly updated and changed as necessary
and that they be fired rapidly when called for.
f. Organization: None.
Nelson L. Thompson
Lieutenant
Colonel, FA
2 Incl Commanding
1. Organizational
Chart
2. General
Officers and VIP Visits
DISTRIBUTION:
2 CINCUSARPAC
3 CG, USARV
6 CO, 52d
Arty Gp
INCLOSURE 1
ORGANIZATIONAL
CHART
1st Battalion, 92d Artillery
INCLOSURE 2
General
Officer and VIP Visits
1. 5
February 1969.
a. Corcoran, Charles
A., Lieutenant General, Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam;
Pepke, Donn R., Major General, Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division.
b. Visited Battery
C located at Fire Base Impossible. (YZ835747).
c. He inspected
Fire Support Base Impossible (YZ835747) and commented that the area
was built up well.
2. 6 February 1969.
a. Sabastion Cabot,
USO entertainer.
b. Visited Fire Base Impossible (YZ835747).
c. Entertainment
visit.
3. 15 February 1969.
a. Pepke, Donn R.,
Major General, Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division.
b. Visited Fire
Base Impossible (YZ835747).
c. Inspected Fire
Support Base Impossible (YZ835747) and also observed the FDC in action
and found everything satisfactory.
3. 3 March 1969.
a. Pepke, Donn R.,
Major General, Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division.
b. Visited Fire
Base Impossible (YZ835747).
c. Command and control
visit. He inspected one of the howitzer sections and checked on adequate
protection for personnel.
5. 10 March 1969:
a. Pepke, Donn R.,
Major General, Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division.
b. Visited Fire
Base Impossible (YZ835747).
c. Inquired as to
where most of the enemy fire was coming from and what was being done
to stop it.
6. 13 March 1969:
a. Schafer III,
Fredrick, Brigadier General, Assistant Division Commander, 4th Infantry
Division.
b. Visited Fire
Support Base 6.
c. Checked battery
for defensive fire planning for Ben Het. Also talked with some of
the men about the Battle of Ben Het.
7. 19 March 1969.
a. Pepke, Donn R.,
Major General, Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division.
b. Visited Fire
Support Base 6.
c. Inspected fire
base for improvements and checked FDC for on call data for Ben Het
area.
8. 21 March 1969.
a. Sidle, Winant,
Brigadier General, Commanding General, I FFORCEV Vietnam Artillery.
b. Visited Fire
Support Base 6.
c. Made visit as
new Commanding General I FFORCEV Artillery. Inspected FDC and one
howitzer section.
9. 1 April 1969.
a. Hollis, Harris
W., Major General, Deputy Commander, I Field Force Vietnam..
b. Visited Fire
Support Base 6.
c. Inspected FDC
and howitzer sections. He talked with personnel of Fire Support Base
6 about the Battle of Ben Het.
10. 11 April 1969.
a. Sidle, Winant,
Brigadier General, Commanding General, I FFORCEV Vietnam Artillery.
b. Visited Landing
Zone Swinger.
c. Visited to congratulate
the battery for their performance under fire. Inspected FDC, howitzer
section and several personnel bunkers.
11. 19
April 1969.
a. Corcoran, Charles
A., Lieutenant General, Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam.
b. Visited Fire
Support Base Impossible (YZ835747).
c. Checked fire
base for security, commended the battery for performance under fire
at LZ Hasty (Kon Horing), inspected FDC, one howitzer sector and personnel
bunkers.
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