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The 1/92nd Field Artillery
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Operational Reports/Lessons Learned

1ST BATTALION, 92D ARTILLERY

1 May '69 to 31 Jul '69

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BATTALION, 92D ARTILLERY
APO 96318

AVGG-BJ                                       5 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

See Distribution

1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. (C) General:

(1) The 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery remains attached to the 52d Artillery Group, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, with its headquarters at Pleiku, Republic of Vietnam and its Forward Command Post in Dak To, Republic of Vietnam, operating in general support of US/RVNAF and FWMAF. The organization has been continuously engaged in action against hostile forces in the Area of Operations of the 24th Special Tactical Zone, in II Corps Tactical Zone, Republic of Vietnam.

(2) Location, status and mission of each unit organic to or OPCON to this battalion are as follows:

(a) Forward Command Post: Grid ZB005217 (Fire Support Base 1, Dak To); Organic; Coordinates all types of fire support for Dak To and Dak Sut subsectors, tactically controls organic and OPCON units and tactically directs fires.

(b) Battalion Headquarters: Grid ZA226535 (Artillery Hill, Pleiku); organic; General Support.

(c) Battery A(-): Grid YA863265 (LZ Elaine): OPCON to 3rd Battalion, 6th Artillery, General Support with priority for fires to 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, 4th Infantry Division.

(d) Battery A Platoon: Grid ZB005217 (Fire Support Base 1, Dak To); Organic; General Support.

(e) Battery B: Grid YB934187 (Fire Support Base 6, 7 KM west of Dak To); Organic; General Support.

(f) Battery C(-): Grid ZA028935 (LZ Bass, 22KM west of Kontum); OPCON to 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery; General Support.

(g) Battery C Platoon: Grid YB869256 (Fire Support Base 12, Ben Het) 15 KM northwest of Dak To; Organic; General Support

(h) Service Battery: Grid ZA226535 (Artillery Hill, Pleiku) Organic: General Support.

(i) Battery A Platoon, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery: Grid YB869256 (Fire Support Base 12, Ben Het); OPCON 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery; General Support.

(j) Battery B(-), 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery: Grid YB869256 (Fire Support Base 12, 15 KM northwest of Dak To); OPCON 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery; General Support.

(k) Battery B Platoon, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery: Grid ZB005216 (Fire Support Base 1, Dak To); OPCON 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery; General Support.

(l) Two (2) M-42's, Battery B, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AW): Grid ZB005217 (Fire Support Base 1, Dak To); Direct Support of Fire Base 1.

(m) 2nd Platoon (-), Battery B, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AW): Grid YB869256 (Fire Support Base 12, Ben Het); Direct Support Battery B, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (which is OPCON 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery).

(n) Metro Section: ZB005217 (Fire Support Base 1, Dak To); Organic; Supports Artillery and weather service in Dak To/Ben Het area.

(o) 254th Radar Detachment: Grid ZB054217 (42nd ARVN Compound, Tan Canh, 4 KM east of Dak To); OPCON to 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery; Provide countermortar surveillance for Dak To area.

(p) 4th Radar Section, 8th Battalion, 26th Target Acquisition Battalion: Grid YB869356 (Fire Support Base 12, Ben Het) OPCON 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery, provide countermortar surveillance for Ben Het area.

(3) The battalion is organized under TO&E 6-425G, dated 31 October 1966, as modified by MTO&E 6-425G dated 13 November 1968.

                  OFF     WO     EM      TOTAL
(a) Authorized    37      6      555      598

(b) Assigned      34      5      568      607

(4) There were 35 personnel in the Battalion wounded during the reporting period. Of these 1 was from Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 1 was from Service Battery, 23 were from Battery A, 9 were from Battery C. Also the battalion, had nine men killed in action. PFC Porter, PFC Burgess, SSG Kraft, PFC Weiser, PFC Davis, SP4 Connell, PFC Carter of Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery, were killed by hostile action. PFC Sisneros, Battery B, died of wounds caused by an exploding breech block. SP4 Greco was on a Forward Observer mission.

b. Intelligence:

(1) Ground observations: Ground observation was performed by the following forward observer teams deployed with maneuver elements:

(a) Two (2) forward observer teams were deployed on 05 May 1969. One team was with the 1st Battalion, 42d Regiment(ARVN) and the other team with the 3rd Mobile Strike Force Battalion.

(b) One (1) forward observer team was deployed on 08 May 1969 with the 4th Battalion, 42d Regiment(ARVN).

(c) On 12 May 1969 the forward observer team with 4th Battalion, 42d Regiment (ARVN) was extracted and redeployed with the 22nd Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Another team was deployed with the 4th Battalion, 42nd Regiment (ARVN).

(d) On 15 May 1969 two (2) forward observer teams were deployed with the 3rd AVRN Cavalry Squadron.

(e) On 20 May 1969 one (1) forward observer team was deployed with the 22nd Ranger Battalion (ARVN).

(f) On 25 May 1969 four (4) forward observer teams were deployed. Teams were inserted with 11th Ranger Battalion (ARVN), 23rd Ranger Battalion (ARVN), 3rd Cavalry Squadron (ARVN) and 5th Mbile Strike Force.

(g) On 29 May 1969 a forward observer team was deployed with the 2nd Mobile Strike Force.

(h) On 03 June 1969 two (2) forward observer teams were deployed. One each with the 2nd Battalion, 47th Regiment (ARVN), and the 4th Battalion, 42nd Regiment (ARVN).

(i) On 04 June 1969 the 4th Mobile Strike Force Battalion deployed with a forward observer team.

(j) On 05 June 1969 a liaison officer/forward observer was deployed with the 22nd Ranger Battalion (ARVN).

(k) On 11 June 1969 a liaison officer was sent to Dak To District subsector.

(l) On 13 June 1969 a forward observer was deployed with the 3rd ARVN Cavalry.

(m) On 16 June 1969 two (2) forward observer teams were deployed. These were with the 1st Battalion, 42nd Regiment (ARVN) and the 2nd Battalion, 47th Regiment (ARVN).

(n) On 17 June 1969 two (2) forward observer teams were deployed with the 5th Mobile Strike Force Battalion and the 3rd Battalion, 47th Regiment (ARVN).

(o) On 22 June 1969 a forward observer team was deployed with the 4th Battalion, 42nd Regiment (ARVN).

(p) On 24 June 1969 a forward observer team was deployed with the 2nd Mobile Strike Force Battalion.

(q) On 28 June 1969 two (2) forward observer teams were deployed with the 53rd Regiment (ARVN). One team went with the 1st Battalion and the other went with the 3rd Battalion.

(r) Two (2) forward observer teams were deployed to Ben Het. One team manned the observation tower and the other team observed from West Hill.

(s) On 05 July 1969 the forward observer team with the 1st Battalion, 47th Regiment (ARVN) was exchanged.

(t) On 09 July 1969 a forward observer team was sent to Dak To district to fire in defensive targets for friendly villages.

(2) Aerial observation: Aerial observation was accomplished throughout the reporting period. On 23 May 1969 two (2) C-1 aircraft (headhunters) with pilots and Aerial Observer's were sent to Dak To on a permanent basis. This facilitated aerial operations because the time usually spent flying from Kontum or Pleiku each day could now be utilized as air observation time.

(3) Radar: Radars were employed to assist the battalion in its operations. A total of two (2) AN/MPQ-4 countermortar radars, one (1) AN/MPQ-10 countermortar radar, one (1) AN/PPS-4 and one (1) AN/PPS-5 were employed. Those units gave countermortar and also personnel movement coverage respectively. The availability of these radars gave the battalion an excellent means of target acquisition. Another distinct advantage is that registrations could be conducted with the AN/MPQ-4 radar.

c. (C) Operations and Training Activities.

(1) Operations.

(a) At the beginning of the reporting period, Battery A(-), 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery, was located at LZ Mary Lou (ZA223829), vicinity of Kontum with a mission of General Support; OPCON 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery, Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery, Platoon was at Ben Het, OPCON 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery, with a mission of general support with priority of fires to Ben Het counterbattery.
On 04 May the battery (-) moved to Fire Support Base 1, Dak To (ZB 003215) with the mission of general support 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery. The Battery supported 24th Special Tactical Zone operations in Dak To/Ben Het area.
On 09 May Fire Support Base 1 began receiving daily incoming enemy fire (mostly 122mm rockets). During the next month 703 rounds of incoming were received at Fire Support Base 1.
On 13 May a 122mm rocket landed approximately 5 feet from a manned howitzer, resulting in 4 men killed in action and 11 men wounded in action. Thirteen volunteers were flown in from base camp at Pleiku that same night as temporary replacements. Daily the battery continued to heroically operate under fire, supporting the maneuver elements and returning accurate and effective counterbattery fire whenever Dak To was attacked. In addition to large numbers of 122mm rockets fired into the Dak To compound, recoiless rife fire was received against the battery position.
On 27 May the battery (-) was assigned the mission of general support with priority of fires to 2nd Ranger Group (ARVN) which was in continuous contact. The mission of Battery A Platoon, 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery continued to be General Support with priority fires to Ben Het counterbattery.
On 28 May a CV-2 aircraft resupplying Ben Het by airdrop accidently dropped a 55 gallon drum of fuel on one of Battery A Platoon's gun bunkers. No casualties resulted, but the flash wall of the right side of the bunder was destroyed and had to be rebuilt.
On 02 June the mission of Battery A (-) was changed to general support with priority of fires to 4th Mobile Strike Force Battalion.
On 04 June 1969 the mission was changed to general support with one platoon in direct support of 4th Mobile Strike Force Battalion.
On 04 June 1969 the battery had 2 men killed in action and 3 men wounded in action as a result of incoming 75mm recoiless rifle fire. During periods of incoming 122mm rocket fire, the enemy began to direct recoiless rifle fire against the battery position area when the men manned the howitzers to fire counterbattery.
On 05 June Battery A Platoon, 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery took a direct hit on a section bunker. No casualties resulted, but one bunker was declared unsage and had to be rebuilt.
On 06 June Battery A Platoon, 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery sustained a direct hit on the powder bunker, resulting in the loss of 560 cannisters of powder.
On 07 June section number 3 at Dak To had a flash wall destroyed by a B-40 rocket.
On 09 June the battery's mission was changed to general support with priority of fires of one platoon to 2nd Mobile Strike Force Battalion.
From 08 June to 12 June one platoon conducted a daily "hipshoot" in order to be capable of firing counterbattery while Dak To was receiving incoming.
On 08 June the Fire Direction Center at Ben Het received a direct hit, resulting in only minor damage.
On 09 June Battery A Platoon had 6 men wounded in action as a result of incoming 75mm recoiless rifle fire.
On 17 June one man was wounded in action from mortar fragments.
On 19 June the mission of Battery A(-) became general support with priority of fires for one platoon to 4th Mobile Strike Force Battalion and for the other platoon to the 5th Mobile Stike Force Battalion.
On 19 June the mission of Battery A(-) reeverted to general support.
Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery (Platoon) sustained 3 hits on gun bunkers on on 22 and 23 June, resulting in only superficial damage.
On 23 June Battery A (Platoon) powder bunker sustained a direct hit resulting in 5 men wounded in action, the loss of 350 cannisters of white bag powder and destruction of the bunker.
On 26 June the crews of Battery A exchanged positions with the crews of Battery C, 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery (Platoon), at Dak To. The howitzers remained in place. Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery was again together as a battery.
On 14 July Battery A moved 4 howitzers to Artillery Hill OPCON 3rd Battalion, 6th Artillery.
On 15 July the Battery (-) was road marched to LZ Oasis and from there to LZ Elaine where it had the mission of general support with priority of fires to 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry.

(b) Battery B, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery was located at Fire Support Base 6 (YB933188) throughout the reporting period.
On 04 May, 24th Special Tactical Zone began operating in the area. Battery B, 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery supported these operations throughout the reporting period.
On 09 May, while engaged in a battalion time on target and massing of fires on an enemy location on Fire Support Base 5, an explosion at the breech end of a howitzer killed one man and wounded six. The wounded were medically evacuated.
On 11 May the damaged howitzer was replaced by one from Battery C, 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery.
On 11 May the one Civilian Irregular Defense Group company security force was increased to two companies (Ben Het Civilian Defense Group and Plateau GI Civilian Defense Group). The Mission of Battery B, 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery was general support until 26 May when it became general support with priority of fires to 1st Battalion, 42nd Regiment (ARVN).
On 04 June the mission was changed to general support with one platoon direct support of 3rd Battalion, 42nd Regiment (ARVN).
On 08 June 1969 Fire Support Base 6 received 16 incoming 75mm recoiless rifle rounds. One round hit the messhall and several hit an ammunition bunker. There were no casualties during this attack. A UH-1 helicopter landing at the time o fthe first attack was hit and crashed on the helipad. Counterbattery fires from 3 batteries was massed in the area from which the unit was receiving the recoiless fire.
The battery's mission reverted to general support on 09 June.
On 11 June Battery B, 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery and Civilian Irregular Defense Group's on Fire Support Base 6 came under attack by an NVA company with sappers. Attack consisted of small arms fire, satchel charges, concussion grenades, B-40 rockets, recoiless rifle and mortar fire. Four (4) stachel charges exploded in the vicinity of number 6 howitzer section, but the section continued to fire throughout contact. No US casualities nor damage was sustained. Two (2) individuals from the Civilian Irregular Defense Group were slightly wounded in action. Twenty-five NVA were killed in action; and many weapons captured in action.
On 19 June the mission became general support with priority of fires to 2nd Battalion, 47th Regiment(ARVN) and 3rd Battalion, 42nd Regiment (ARVN).
On 05 July the battery's mission was changed to general support with priority of fires to 22nd Ranger Battalion (ARVN).
On 09 July the mission reverted to general support.
During the last two weeks of the reporting period aerial resupply has been difficult because of monsoon weather.

(c) Battery C, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery moved by road from Artillery Hill on 01 May 1969, to Plei Ring De (ZA 218351) OPCON 3rd Howitzer Battalion, 6th Artillery with mission of general support.
02 May 1969 Battery C moved to Asphalt Plant (AR 896118)with mission of general support.
On 01 June 1969 Battery C Platoon moved from Ashpalt Plant by road to Fire Support Base Mary Lou (ZA 223829) OPCON 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery with the mission ofgeneral support priority of fire for the defense of Kontum.
On 24 June the Platoon moved by road to Dak To (ZB 004217); with the mission of general support, Dak To/Ben Het area.
On 26 June 1969 Battery C(-) moved by road from the Asphalt Plant to LZ Bass (ZA028935) and passed from OPCON of the 3rd Battalion, 6th Artillery to 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery with the mission of general support priority of fires to 4th Infantry Division units.

(d) Towards the end of April and the beginning of May 1969 intelligence indicators pointed to a build up of NVA Forces in the Dak To/Ben Het area. It was discovered that two infantry regiments and major portions of an artillery regiment were present to the south of Ben Het, Fire Support Base 6, and Dak To. The target appeared to be Dak To.
On 04 May 1969, 24th Special Tactical Zone established a Combined Tactical Operations Center at Fire Support Base 1, Dak To in order to control the troops being inserted into the area to counter the enemy threat. The commander of the 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery, was designated the Fire Support Cooordinator for the Dak To/Ben Het area of operations. The Dak To Combined Fire Support Coordination Center under his control was to control the fires of not only US but also all ARVN Artillery in the area. This would eventually evolve into the equivalent of one Battalion Group; Fourty-one tubes of Field Artillery and six Air Defense Artillery twin 40mm M-42's. The Fire Support Coordination Center also coordinated all air fires, to include B-52 Strikes, Forward Air Control directed Tactical Air Strikes, radar directed combat sky spots and helicopter gunships.
During the period 04 May to 08 July this force coordinated over 150,000 rounds of Artillery, 1100 sorties of Forward Air Control directed Tactical Air Control airstrikes 533 combat sky spots and 142 B-52 strikes. During this time 24th Special Tactical Zone employed nineteen maneuver battalions, with as many as nine battalions committed at one time. During the period, friendly elements killed more than 1800 enemy troops. Due to growing complexity of the organization and situation, a Battalion Group was established on 09 June 1969. The Forward Command Post remained at Dak To while 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery established a Forward Command Post at Ben Het. Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery was designated the Battalion Group Commander. During the period of operations both Command Posts were subjected to intense enemy fire and bot areas were subjected to sapper attacks.

(e) The Combined Fire Support Coordination Center at the 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery Forward Command Post in Dak To ensured the most effective engagement of ground targets by coordinating the employment of artillery, chemical strikes, automatic weapons fires, tactical air strikes, and B-52 strikes. It also ensured the safety of friendly aircraft, troop population and properly posting air advisories over the air warning coordination center station, Toll House Lima, and by clearing all fires both tactically and politically. In order to do this the 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery liaison section was collocated with ARVN Artillery Liaison Officers, a district representative with power to grant political clearances, the USAF and RVNAF air liaison officers and parties, 24th Special Tactical Zone G-3 Air, and 24th Special Tactical Zone G-3(with power to grant tactical clearances). Within the same Tactical Operations Center the 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery operations and S-2 sections were located. Through the Fire Support Coordination Center the two forces were combined and coordinated enabling successful artillery support to the ground elements located in the area.


(f) The following assistance was provided during the reporting period in conjunction with the ARVN assistance program:

(1) A fire direction center and firing battery assistance team was sent to Dak Seang. (See Training)

(2) During the reporting period seventeen RF/PF offensive operations were supported by U.S. Artillery under control of 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery.

(3) There were seventy-four defensive targets fired for the villagers in the Dak To sub sector.

(4) Metro support was provided to the 37th Artillery (ARVN) and 63rd Artillery (ARVN) during this reporting period.

(5) Artillery support has been provided to the 42d ARVN Regiment which is located at Tan Canh and to other elemnts OPCON to 24th Special Tactical Zone operating in the Dak To/Ben Het area.

(6) Forward observer parties have been provided to accompany ARVN maneuver elements on three operations.

(7) Combined artillery operations were planned and conducted during the reporting period.

(8) Battery A, 63rd Artillery (ARVN) was provided the use of a bulldozer to prepare positions at Dak To.

(9) Provided both maintenance and necessary parts to get ARVN howitzer off deadline.

(10) Provided tin roofing and other building material for 42nd ARVN Regiment.

(11) Many truckloads of empty powder cannisters with some building materials were provided to Dien "Binh and Kon Horing.

(2) Training.

(a) The battalion had three officers and two enlisted men who attended Forward Observer School this quarter.

(b) The battalion had three officers and four enlisted men who attended Forward Direction Operations School this quarter.

(c) On the job training continued for personnel in all batteries during the quarter. Emphasis was on maintenance, fire direction, crew drill and communications.

(d) A class was conducted for the 299th Engineer Battalion in the adjustment of Artillery Fire.

(e) Fire direction and firing battery asistance teams at Dak Seang reported good programs in training Civilian Irregular Defense Group in Fire Direction Center and Firing Battery procedures.

(f) During the reporting period newly arrived personnel ceased attending the orientation program taught by members of each battalion and 52nd Artillery Group. This consists of a four day block of instruction.

d. (C) Logistics:

(1) Battery A moved 198 tons of supplies by helicopter in the Kontum area.

(2) Battery B moved 1740 tons of supplies by helicopter in the Dak To area.

(3) Battery C moved 703 tons of supplies by helicopter in the Plei Trap Valley area.

(4) The battalion total for supplies moved by air is approximately 2641 tons.

(5) Projects accomplished were:

(a) Continued efforts were made in the improvement of the bunker and trench lines in the base camp area.

(b) An increase liaison status with the 88th S&S Battalion and the 62nd Maintenance Battalion was brought into effect and consequently a better, more efficient support status was established.

(c) The Battalion, through combined efforts of the Battalion Ammunition Section and the Battalion S-4 Section, has established a Class I, IV and V resupply station for all OPCON units in the Dak To/Ben Het area.

(d) The present time of the year being the monsoon season in the Central Highlands, an intensified program of waterproofing and drainage improvement was instituted throughout the battalion. The problems of this nature corollated with the monsoons has been overcome.

(6) Battery B continues to rely on air movement of supplies to the fire base. The battery has established a rear staging area with qualified rigging personnel to insure that resupply is properly maintained. Battery A is presently resupplied, partially by road and partially by air, from Oasis. Battery C is presently resupplied by air from Landing Zone Mary Lou.

(7) Since this battalion is the only 155mm (towed) battalion capable of being airlifted in the 52d Artillery Group, it is frequently called upon to assist 52d Artillery Group and other units in preparing equipment for air movement. Some of these items rigged and prepared for movement have been radar equipment, ammunition, rations and barrier materials.

e. Civil Affairs.

(1) Civil Affairs: The main effort of civil affairs activities of the 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery was concentrated in the villages and hamlets along highway 512 and QL-14 in the vicinity of Dak To. The S-5 coordinted with the Dak To subsector senior advisor, Major Culp, for all civil affairs activities. During the reporting period civil affairs consisted of the following.

(2) Nine 2½ t6n truck loads of empty 155mm powder cannisters were delivered to Dien Binh and Kon Horing for use in building fortification.

(3) The battalion surgeon and personnel from Headquarters Battery made fourteen MEDCAP visits during the reporting period, 666 villagers were provided with general medical care.

(4) United States newspapers were provided to the senior advisor at Dak To subsector for distribution to the villagers.

(5) Plastic matting and tin roofing was provided to Kon Horing and Dien Binh for use in waterproofing dwellings.

(6) Seventy-four defensive targets were fired in for villages in the Dak To subsector.

(7) Air items were loaned to Battery A, 37th Artillery (ARVN) in order to airlift 155mm howitzers to Fire Support Base 5.

(8) 1000 sandbags were provided to ARVN Artillery for revertments.

(9) Survey was provided to ARVN Artillery when requested.

(10) Helicopters were used to medavac ARVN on several occasions.

(11) Mechanics and parts were provided for maintenance on several 105mm howitzers (ARVN) during the reporting period.

(12) The district medical assistance team, Sgt. Johnson, with Cpt. Jacobs, S-5 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery, visited the Catholic hospital located at Dak To. The hospital presently consists of one Swedish doctor and two nurses. A roll of plastic was presented to the hospital to be used to help the hospital from the rain. This hospital provides medical aid to the civilian population located around Dak To. The civilian medical facilities located in Dak To district consists of one hospital located at Dak To, one hospital located at Kon Horing and one dispensary located at Tri Lo. The two hospitals located in Dak To district are operated by Catholic organizations to provide medical aid to the civilian population. The dispensarylocated at Tri Lo is run and supported by Vietnamese Government. The Vietnamese government provides support and assistance to the Catholic hospitals here in the district. The 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery will provide assistance in the area of medical aid through the Tri Lo dispensary for the area served by this facility; Villages and Hamlets around highway 512 from Fire Support Base 1 to Dak Roloang. The medical assistance team will provide assistance and training practices to help upgrade the medical care given by the Vietnamese medic in the Tri Lo dispensary. The medical team will also conduct MEDCAPS to the different villages/hamlets which the Tri Lo dispensary serves.

f. Personnel: Key personnel changes which took place during the quarter were:

(1) Lieutenant Colonel Nelson L. Thompson was reassigned to the Washington, D.C. area upon his departure from the Battalion on 03 July 1969.

(2) Lieutenant Colonel Clarence L. Stearns assumed command of the Battalion on 03 July 1969.

(3) Captain Joseph Sasarak, Jr. replaced Captain Bohdan Prehar as Commander of Battery A, on 12 May 1969. Captain Prehar was reassigned as Senior Liaison Officer within the battalion.

(4) The battalion lost through normal rotation or reassignment the services of nine officers during the reporting period.

(5) The battalion received eleven new officers during the reporting period.

(6) Personnel in the battalion received during the reporting period one Legion of Merit Medal, twenty-fout Bronze Star Medals (fourteen for Valor), one Air Medal, seventy-five Army Commendation Medals (sixty-seven for Valor) and eight Purple Hearts.

g. Artillery:

(1) During the quarter, elements of this battalion made a total of thirteen tactical moves; ten by road and three by air.

(2) During the reporting period the battalion fired 41,599 rounds in support of tactical and pacification operations. In addition, the battalion controlled batteries which fired 19,214 rounds of light artillery and 7,361 rounds of heavy artillery.

(3) On 11 June 1969, Battery B, located at Fire Support Base 6 (YB934187) received a ground attack at 0445 hours. Surveilance the next morning found 25 enemy killed in action. There was no penetration of the perimeter by the enemy force. Battery B fired direct fire in self defense.

(4) During the period, the platoon from Battery A located at Fire Support Base 12, Ben Het, received numerous standoff attacks. Counterbattery and counter mortar fires were directed against these standoff attacks, with significant results, one of which being that only one man from this Battalion lost his life during the siege of Ben Het.

h. Other: Visits by General Officers and other VIP's.

(1) During the quarter the battalion received twenty-nine visits by VIP's.

(2) A list of visits by VIP's is attached as Inclosure 2.

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel: None

b. Operations: Hipshoot to support counterbattery fires.

(1) Observations: During a month long period, Dak To was subjected to daily incoming artillery fire. Enemy locations were quickly obtained and effectively engaged by friendly artillery. The enemy developed the tactics of attacking the compound with 122mm rockets, and then when the crews would man their howitzers to fire counterbattery the enemy would fire recoiless rifle rounds nto the artillery position areas, thus inflicting casualties and diminishing the effectiveness of our fires. In order to allow a portion of the battery to effectively shoot counter battery fire from Dak To and battery position areas under fire, a platoon of Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery ws daily sent out to "hipshoot" positions. Before dark the platoon would return to Dak To. However, since dusk attacks were common, the platoon would occupy supplementary positions until after dark, at which time it would return to the battery postion area.

(2) Evaluation: The above is an effective means of preserving an accurate and effective counterbattery capability when the enemy has accurate firing data on the battery's primary position area. The danger rests in the possibility of ambush while engaged in road march, and also in the possibility of a ground attack in the "hipshoot" position where security is less. These factors must be considered when planning use of this tactic. Times and places must be changed so that a constant pattern does not allow the enemy to take advantage of this tactic to attack the "hipshoot" elements.

(3) Recommendation: Commanders should carefully consider the use of the above tactic, as well as others, when it is indicated that a primary position area is "zeroed in" butg for some reason cannot be significantly relocated.

c. Operations: Ambush by Artillery:

(1) Observation: Reconnaissance teams have discovered enemy roads which are heavily travelled by enemy convoys, but have been unable to attack these convoys by ground because of insufficient forces or by air because of weather or other limitations. An effective means of engaging these targets has been to adjust on two ends of a roadrunner along a straight portion of the road, to alert the artillery to be loaded and ready when a convoy is known to be approaching, and to call for the road runner to be fired when the convoy is in the killing zone. The most effective method has been to wait until the middle of the convoy is in the center of the roadrunner, and then to simultaneously begin firing from both ends towards the middle.

(2) Evaluation: This method of attack has proven very effective in actual use and has resulted in the destruction of many enemy trucks.

(3) Recommendation: It is recommended that the above method of attack be used along enemy roads or trails whenever ground or air attacks cannot be utilized and also in conjunction with ground and air attacks.

d. Operations: Air advisories for B-52 Strikes:

(1) Observations: Warnings of impending B-52 strikes are usually broadcast on the "on guard" frequency USAF. However, during combined operations in which a great amount of Tactical Air and Army Aviation as well as B-52 strikes were used, it was found that many aircraft would miss the air advisories because of inability to monitor the correct frequency while working on others. This problem was solved at the Combined Fire Support Coordination Center by having the advisory broadcasted not only on "on guard" but also by the Air Warning Coordination Center (Tollhouse Lima) station and the ALO (Both Colocated).

(2) Evaluation: After initiating the multiple broadcasting of advisories there were no reports of aircraft missing the warning of impending B-52 strikes and being endangered by proximity to the strike. This was a pragmatic solution to an existing problem.

(3) Recommendation: When the prescribed means of disseminating warnings is not effectively alerting everyone required, alternate means of dissemination must be discovered. Collocation of air, artillery, and fire support coordination elements facilitates finding the best combination of alternatives.

e. Operations: Use of smoke and high explosive in suppression for aerial resupply.

(1) Observations: During the month of June 1969 Ben Het was surrounded by large numbers of well armed and well dug-in NVA. The enemy had the firing data for the airfield and for all established helicopter pads. When an aircraft attempted to land it not only received small arms and automatic weapons fire, but immediately upon landing it ws subjected to mortar and recoiless rifle fire. Because the road to Ben Het was effectively cut by large NVA forces, aerial resupply was essential. In order to counter the enemy's accurate and effective fires, it was necessary to:

(a) Select the most likely enemy firing positions upon which the suppressive fires would be delivered.

(b) Select the best locations for screening the enemy's observation and lay down a smoke screen by both artillery and air delivery.

(c) Select alternate sites upon which to land. All available artillery was employed, therefore close coordination was necessary. Among other things a corridor had to be given to the aircraft, and the controller had to be capable of instantly turning the suppression on and off.

(2) Evaluation: The use of smoke and high explosive suppressive fires to gether with a change of LZ's proved extremely effective. The intensity and accuracy of the enemy's fires were greatly reduced. No aircraft were shot down or seriously damaged by ground fire while this program was being employed. A requirement to maintain the effectiveness of this program is that the points of impact be changed often enough that the enemy cannot detect the tactic by a simple relocation.

(3) Recommendation: When the enemy is within mortar and recoiless rifle range of a landing zone, suppressive fires whould be fired utilizing both high explosive and smoke in order to keep the enemy "holed up" and blinded. If the established landing zone is "zeroed in", alternate landing zones should be used.

 

 

                                  Clarence L. Stearns
                                  Lieutenant Colonel, FA
2 Incl                            Commanding
1. Unit Organizational Chart
2
. General Officers and VIP Visits

DISTRIBUTION:
2 CINCUSARPAC
3 CG, USARV
6 CO, 52d Arty Gp


INCLOSURE 1

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
1st Battalion, 92d Artillery



INCLOSURE 2

General Officer and VIP Visits

1. 01 May 1969

a. Major General David S. Parker, Commanding General, USARV Engineers.
b. Visited Battery A Platoon located at Fire Base 12 (ZB871256).

2. 05 May 1969

a. Lieutenant General Charles A. Corcoran, Commanding General I Field Forces Vietnam, Major General Donn R. Pepke, Commanding General 4th Infantry Division.
b. Visited Battalion Tactical Operatons Center.
c. Briefed on combined operaton in the Dak To/Ben Het area.

3. 11 May 1969

a. Lieutenant General Charles A. Corcoran, Commanding General I Field Forces Vietnam, Brigadier General Alvin Irzych, 4DC, 4th Infantry Division.
b. Visited Battalion Tactical Operations Center.
c. Briefed by Battalion Commander on current operations.

4. 13 May 1969

a. Lieutenant General Charles A. Corcoran, Commanding General I Field Forces Vietnam, Major General Donn R. Pepke, Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division.
b. Visited Battalion Tactical Operations Center.
c. Briefed on Artillery support for current operation.

5. 15 May 1969

a. General William R. Rosson, Deputy Commanding General MACV; Brigadier General Winant Sidle, Commanding General I Field Forces Vietnam Artillery.
b. Visited Dak To.
c. Briefed on the current tactical situation of 24th Special Tactical Zone.

6. 19 May 1969

a. Major General Donn R. Pepke, Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division.
b. Visited Fire Support Base 3.
c. Briefed on current plans to include arclights.

7. 22 May 1969

a. Major General Donn R. Pepke, Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division.
b. Visited Battalion Tactical Operations Center Dak To.
c. Briefed on current situation.

8. 23 May 1969

a. Brigadier General James S. Timothy, Deputy Senior Advisor, II Corps.
b. Visited Battalion Tactical Operations Center at Dak To, Fire Support Base 6 and Fire Support Base 5.
c. Breifed on current tactical situation in Dak To/Ben Het area and artillery support at the Fire Bases.

9. 26 May 1969

a. Major General Joseph R. Russ, Deputy Commanding General, I Field Forces Vietnam, Brigadier General James S. Timothy, Deputy Senior Advisor, II Corps.
b. Battalion Tactical Operations Center Dak To.
c. Breifed on tactical situation and new operations in the Ben Het area.

10. 27 May 1969

a. Major General Donn R. Pepke, Commanding General, 4th Infanty Division.
b. Battalion Tactical Operations Center Dak To.
c. Briefed on tactical situation and the status of 24th Special Tactical Zone operation Dan Cuyen 38A.

11. 30 May 1969

a. General Creighton W. Abrams, Commanding General USARV.
b. Battalion Tactical Operations Center Dak To.
c. Briefed on tactical situation and current status of 24th Special Tactical Zone operation Dan Cuyen 38A.

12. 01 June 1969

a. Major General Joseph R. Russ, Deputy Commanding General I Field Forces Vietnam, Brigadier General James S. Timothy, Deputy Senior Advisor, II Corps.
b. Battalion Tactical Operations Center Dak To.
c. Briefed by Battalion Commander on tactical situation.

13. 02 June 1969

a. Brigadier General Winant Sidle, Commanding General, I Field Forces Vietnam Artillery.
b. Visited Fire Support Base 1, Dak To.
c. Attended a demonstration on the AN/PPS-5 Radar.

14. 05 June 1969

a. Major General Joseph R. Russ, Deputy Commanding General I Field Forces Vietnam, Brigadier General James S. Timothy, Deputy Senior Advisor II Corps.
b. Battalion Tactical Operations Center Dak To.
c. Briefed on tactical situation and problems of enemy rocketing of Dak To.

15. 07 June 1969

a. Marvin Miller, better known as Michael Anthony, star of television program "The Millionaire".
b. 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery Base Camp, Pleiku, RVN.
c. Gave out checks and visited with the personnel of the unit.

16. 09 June 1969

a. Brigadier General Winant Sidle, Commanding General, I Field Forces Vietnam Artillery.
b. Visited Fire Support Base 1, Dak To.
c. Looked at artillery area and briefed on tactical situation.

17. 14 June 1969

a. General William B. Rosson, Deputy Commanding General, MACV.
b. Dak To.
c. Briefed on update of current tactical situation of 24th Special Tactical Zone operation.

18. 18 June 1969

a. Brigadier General Winant Sidle, Commanding General, I Field Forces Vietnam Artillery.
b. Battalion Tactical Operations Center at Dak To.
c. Presented awards and was briefed on situation in Dak To/Ben Het areas.

19. 19 June 1969

a. Lieutenant General Charles A. Corcoran, Commanding General, I Field Forces Vietnam.
b. Battalion Tactical Operations Center at Dak To.
c. Briefed and given short tour of the facilities and operation at Dak To.

20. 22 June 1969

a. Major General Lu Lan, Commanding General II Corps, Brigadier General James S. Timothy, Deputy Senior Advisor II Corps.
b. Battalion Tactical Operations Center Dak To, RVN.
c. Briefed on tactical situation at Dak To/Ben Het and had lunch in Artillery mess hall.

21. 24 June 1969

a. Brigadier General Winant Sidle, Commanding General, I Field Forces Vietnam Artillery.
b. Battalion Tactical Operations Center Dak To.
c. Briefed on use of Artillery around Ben Het and arclight request.

22. 25 June 1969

a. Brigadier General James S. Timothy, Deputy Senior Advisor II Corps, Brigadier General Winant Sidle, Commanding General I Field Forces Vietnam Artillery.
b. Dak To Tactical Operations Center.
c. Briefed on current situation.

23. 26 June 1969

a. Lieutenant General Charles A. Corcoran, Commanding General, I Field Forces Vietnam.
b. Dak To Tactical Operations Center.
c. Briefed on current situation in 24th Special Tactical Zone.

24. 29 June 1969

a. General William B. Rosson, Deputy Commanding General MACV, Lieutenant General Charles A. Corcoran, Commanding General I Field Forces Vietnam, Major General Lu Lan, Commanding General, II Corps, Brigadier General James S. Timothy, Deputy Senior Advisor II Corps.
b. Visited Dak To and Ben Het.
c. Briefed on the search and destroy operation Cuyet Thang 1, and discussed the status of artillery units at Ben Het.

25. 01 July 1969

a. Lieutenant General Charles A. Corcoran, Commanding General, I Field Forces Vietnam.
b. Visited Fire Support Base 1.
c. Briefed on enemy activities at Fire Support Base 24 and covered current class V status and management.

26. 02 July 1969

a. Brigadier General Albert E. Hunter, Commanding General Qui Nhon Support Command.
b. Fire Support Base 1.
c. Briefed on resupply of ammunition and rations.

27. 03 July 1969

a. Senator Stevens from Alaska, Senator Bellmon from Oklahoma, Brigadier General Winant Sidle, Commanding General, I Field Forces Vietnam Artillery.
b. Visited Dak To and Ben Het.
c. Briefed on current tactical situation of the 24th Special Tactical Zone.

28. 04 July 1969

a. Lieutenant General Charles A. Corcoran, Commanding General I Field Forces Vietnam.
b. Ben Het.
c. Received update briefing on Queyet Thang III.

29. 19 July 1969

a. Brigadier General Winant Sidle, Commanding General, I Field Forces Vietnam Artillery.
b. Visited Fire Support Base 12, Ben Het.
c. Inspected the status of engineer projects in progress at Ben Het.


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