DEPARTMENT OF THE
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310
IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (30 Nov 67) FOR OT RD-670645 11 December 1967
Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters,
1st Battalion, 92d Artillery, Period Ending 31 July 1967
TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION
1. Subject report
is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with
paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c
and, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported
to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained
in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future
from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for
use in developing training material.
BY ORDER OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:
1 Incl Colonel,
The Adjutant General
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army War College
US Army Air Defense School
US Army Armor School
US Army Artillery and Missile School
US Army Aviation School
US Army Chemical School
US Army Civil Affairs School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Intelligence School
US Army Medical Field Service School
US Army Military Police School
US Army Ordnance School
US Army Quartermaster School
US Army Security Agency School
US Army Signal School
US Army Special Warfare School
US Army Transportation School
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
The Surgeon General
The Provost Marshal General
Research Analysis Corporation (Library)
Dr. Martin J. Bailey, OSD (SA)
Joint Action Control Office
Documents Control Officer, Bell Aero Systems
5th Battalion, 42d Artillery
6th Battalion, 84th Artillery
6th Battalion, 33d Artillery
1st Battalion, 92d Artillery
OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BATTALION, 92D ARTILLERY
Report for Quarterly Period Ending July 1967
(RCS CSFOR - 65)
TO: See Distribution
SECTION 1 (C) SIGNIFICANT
ORGANIZATIONAL OR UNIT ACTIVITIES
1. (C) General
a. During the reporting
period this battalion has furnished artillery support to the 4th Infantry
Division, 173rd Airborne Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AM), 11th
Ranger Battalion (ARVN). Meteorological support (visual) has been
furnished the battalion's firing batteries and batteries of the 4th
Infantry Division and 173rd Airborne Brigade. The battalion has participated
in Operation FRANCIS MARION and Operation GREELY.
b. This battalion
is attached to the 52nd Artillery Group.
c. Batteries of
the battalion have made one air move by C-130 and five more moves
by helicopter during the reporting period.
d. Current missions
of the batteries:
A: Attached 173rd Airborne Brigade
B: GSR to 6-29 Artillery (4th Inf Div)
C: GSR to 4-42nd Artillery (4th Inf Div)
Battery D: GS, Pleiku Defense
Battery E: GS, Francis Marion AO (Battery E is composed
of two howitzers from Battery C and an FDC from battalion).
The batteries have
answered all ARVN and U.S. Forces request for fires within range.
Days spent in movement, training and operations are as follows:
77 (Movement and training done in conjunction with operations. Battalion
spent all days of reporting period on operations).
2. (C) Intelligence:
Target intelligence was obtained for the firing batteries through the
direct support battalions. Target intelligence was also obtained by
the battalion forward CP, our forward observer with the 11th Ranger
Battalion (ARVN), battalion forward observer with the 1st Parachute
Regiment (ARVN), visual reconnaissance flights by battalion personnel.
Study of II Corps intelligence summaries, and from Company B, 5th Special
Forces. Patrols conducted by the 52nd Artillery Group have also provided
3. (C) Operations
and Training Activities:
a. Plans: No significant
(1) The battalion
has participated in Operation FRANCIS MARION during the entire reporting
(2) The battalion
has participated in Operation GREELY from 17 June through 31 July.
(3) The battalion
has experienced little difficulty in having firing batteries support
three different units. The only problem was scarcity of transportation
for command and control and coordination.
(4) The metro
section has been providing visual mets since mid-May. Metro was
established at locations where it was most needed.
(5) The battalion
survey section is used to extend survey control to the firing elements,
(6) A chronological
list of operational activities during the quarter follows:
1 May 67: Battery
C (YA893372) fired heavy contact mission against NVA battalion at
YA795328 (significant in that the battery was firing for 20 minutes
(and 100 rounds) prior to any other artillery, to include DS batteries).
The FO's still with 11th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) at Edap Enang.
Battery B fired 500 rounds H & I.
6 May 67: Headquarters
Battery 2 1/2 ton truck fired on at ZA219598.
24 May 67: Three
howitzers from Battery B and a FDC from battalion moved to AQ862991
(PHU NHON District Headquarters) to provide DS for a search and
destroy mission conducted by Regional Forces-Popular Forces. Also
one FO was provided.
30 May 67: Battery
B released from GSR 4-42nd Arty, and assigned GSR 3-319th Arty.
31 May 67: R.
C. Amenson, battalion CO, promoted to Colonel.
1 June 67: Battery
B moved to ZA081212, GSR 3-319 Arty.
4 June 67: Visual
Metro team sent to Battery B.
4 June 67: Two
tubes from Battery A and a battalion FDC closed BR035549.
7 June 67: Two
tubes from Battery A departed BR035549 and returned to Battery A.
8 June 67: Two
howitzers from Battery A and a battalion FDC moved to AQ998867.
DS of search and destroy operation by Regional Force-Popular Force
10 June 67: Artillery
Hill mortared. 31 rounds of 60mm and 82mm received in 1/92 Arty
headquarters area. 38 WIA. Countermortar fire, to include beehive
(direct fire), conducted by battery D. Unconfirmed reports indicate
80 casualties inflicted on the enemy. Minor equipment damage.
11 June 67: LTC
Joe B. Myers assumed command of 1/92 Artillery.
12 June 67: Battery
B moved to PLEI ME (ZA164062). GSR 3-319th Arty. Battery D fired
vicinity ZA14755625 and observed very large secondary explosion.
Battalion forward CP at ZA119288 closed out.
15 June 67: Battery
B closed Artillery Hill.
16 June 67: Battery
B replaced Battery A at BR128548. Battery A closed Artillery Hill.
17 June 67: Battery
A prime movers and howitzers, FDC 3/4 ton truck, First Sergeant
3/4 ton truck and BC 1/4 ton truck and appropriate personnel moved
by C-130 aircraft to DAK TO. Battery trains and battalion support
vehicles moved by road to DAK TO. Battery A attached to 173rd Airborne
Brigade. Visual metro team sent with battery.
18 June 67: Battery
C moved to ZA119288. Released from GSR 6-29th Arty, and assigned
GST 4-42nd Arty.
19 June 67: 2
1/2 ton truck from Headquarters Battery carrying 25 Montagnards
struck a mine at ZA208599. Truck destroyed. Only injury was driver
got a split lip.
22 June 67: Four
howitzers from Battery B and a battalion FDC moved to BR035549.
DS 173rd Airborne Brigade, S & D operation north of Highway
19E. Battery C moved by helilift (four howitzers) to ZA023087. Remaining
two howitzers attached to C 3-18th Arty at ZA119288 until battalion
FDC commitments eased and battalion could assume fire control.
26 June 67: Battery
B moved to Kontum. Attached 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AM).
Battalion forward CP established at Kontum.
28 June 67: Battery
B helilifted to YB902082. One FO assigned to 1st Parachute Regiment
(ARVN) until 26 July.
3 July 67: Battery
B helilifted to AS9016. Sky-crane carrying a Battery B howitzer
crashed at LZ, AS9016. Howitzer later recovered and repaired.
6 July 67: Visual
metro team moved from Battery A to Battery C.
8 July 67: Battery
D firing at ZA(illegible) obtained two secondary explosions.
9 July 67: Battery
B helilifted to AS935211.
21 July 67 Battery
D conducted an artillery raid, firing at AR843673.
22 July 67: Battery
B moved by road to AR8992.
24 July 67: Battery
B moved to Kontum. Released attachment 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry
25 July 67: Battery
B moved to Artillery Hill. Battalion Forward CP at Kontum closed
26 July 67: Battery
B moved to DUC CO, GSR 6-29 Arty.
28 July 67: Battalion
forward CP established at OASIS.
c. Training: Training
in selected subjects is conducted weekly at battery level.
d. Chemical: No
e. Psywar: No significant
f. Other: No significant
4 (C) Logistics: Logistics
have presented no problems. FSA's are utilized for resupply. Currently
ammunition resupply is being run by the S4 for Battery C and Battery
B from Pleiku. Aircraft sorties this quarter:
5. (U) Civil Affairs:
No significant activities.
6. (C) Personnel:
a. Casualties: 39
b. During the period
the following personnel actions occurred:
(3) Present for
duty strength as of 31 July: 583
(a) E4: 46
(b) E5: 35
(c) E6: 2
(5) Mail: Mail
support is good.
(6) R and R quotas:
(7) Pay has been
timely and accurate.
7. (C) Artillery:
Rounds expended during the period:
* Since 1/92 assumed
control of Battery D.
RDS IN VN
(U) Other: No
SECTION 2 (C) COMMANDER'S
OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Part 1. Observations
1. (C) Personnel:
a. Item: MOS 13E20
battalion has four firing batteries. The TOE FDC personnel are insufficient
to operate 24 hours a day. The battalion FDC furnishes additional
personnel to the firing batteries, but the battalion FDC operates
the fire direction center for Battery D and furnishes an additional
FDC when a battery splits. This limits the assistance battalion can
give the firing batteries to build up their FDC's.
and batteries train additional, non-critical personnel in fire direction.
Such personnel are wiremen, survey, etc. There is no need to increase
FDC TOE strength.
2. (C) Operations:
a. Item: Helilift
battalion has moved batteries by helicopter with two different divisions.
With both divisions preparation and planning by the battalion and
battery has been identical, indicating that no difference exists between
major units in helicopter moves. The only difference lies in control
of the helicopters assigned to lift the battery. One division controlled
the helicopters throughout the move, including pick-up and touch-down.
This resulted in the battalion and battery not knowing when the next
pickup would be and having howitzers put down in positions not desired
by the battery. The other division allocated the required sorties
and the battalion and battery controlled the entire move, to include
pathfinder team (battery advance party). No problems encountered when
the battalion controlled the move of the battery.
a battery is helilifted the battalion should have the helicopters
on its own control frequency and the helicopters responsive at all
times to the battalion. On congested LZ's the battery advance party
can coordinate incoming sorties with the LZ control party.
b. Item: Air Moves
Discussion: One battery (minus) was moved by C-130. The aircraft were
allocated by the major headquarters making the move. Planning for
such a contingency as an air move was done by the battalion operations
section well in advance. Coordination between the battalion S3 and
S4, utilizing the advance planning, was effected and no problems were
must always be aware of the many different means of transportation
available to them and plan accordingly. Preparation prevent problems
c. Item: Assisting
Maneuver Forces to Locate Themselves
the flat, heavily overgrown areas of the central highlands, the infantry
sometimes has difficulty establishing their exact location. In addition
to marking rounds, the 1/22 Infantry utilizes the defensive targets
fired around their positions and the artillery plots the location
artillery can establish within 50 meters the location of friendly
units by resection.
d. Item: Towed
Medium Artillery Maneuverability
towed 155mm Howitzer can be moved into areas inaccessible to self-propelled
artillery through the use of helicopters. This gives the infantry
added artillery firepower in remote areas. However, in the monsoon
in the central highlands, the towed 155mm howitzer is moved on the
ground with great difficulty. The five ton prime mover cannot negotiate
the wet roads and trails pulling a six and on-half ton weapon. Some
of the areas the batteries have been into had little more than trails
for access. Movement into these areas was possible only with APC's
pulling both the prime movers and the howitzers. Planning moves on
poor roads it is necessary to triple the time normally required for
a move to allow for the prime movers and howitzers to be pulled from
the mud or back onto the road. It is also necessary to plan for APC's
whose sole duty is to pull prime movers and howitzers.
of the towed 155mm howitzer would be tremendously improved if the
XM548 full tracked cargo carrier were used as a prime mover. This
would give the towed howitzer the same cross-country maneuverability
as the self-propelled howitzer and retain the airlift capability.
Towed 155mm howitzers of the battalion should not be replaced by self-propelled
weapons. Simply increase their mobility.
e. Item: Artillery
Discussion: Artillery units must build fortifications immediately
upon occupation. Priorities must be established.
priorities of fortification within this battalion are the following:
personnel overhead cover first, ammunition second, weapon, third miscellaneous
last. Personnel are the most vulnerable. In any type attack, casualties
would mean a slowdown in mission. Before night fall, all personnel
have cover. The howitzers are least likely to suffer damage. Also,
the parapets for the 155mm howitzer, towed, are so large that the
parapet offers little protection except from small-arms attack. The
priorities established have already proven themselves.
f. Item: Field
Expedient Bangalore Torpedoes.
fire support bases, brush and small trees can be cleared through the
use of excess powder charges from the artillery. Punch a hole in a
discarded powder canister, stuff excess powder charges in it, place
one-half pound of primed TNT inside, seal it, and an excellent bangalore
torpedo is made.
useful purpose for excess powder charges rather than burning them.
g. Item: 155mm
every firing position that batteries of this battalion have occupied
except one, the fire support base or LZ has also been occupied by
a 105mm battery. The infantry and the direct support battery are always
first there and lack of knowledge of space requirements for a 155mm
battery is always evident. In every case the 105mm battery occupies
more space than the 155mm battery. The infantry and direct support
artillery, being first in, take the space they require and plan the
perimeter. The 155mm battery is then squeezed into whatever real estate
is left. This gives less than maximum benefit to the infantry in sheaf.
Lack of transportation to this battalion means no staff planning can
be done at a fire support base of LZ to allocate real estate.
personnel occupying a fire support base and especially the senior
man, should be aware of relative space requirements for 105's and
h. Item: Maximum
Utilization of Battalion Staff
potential of this battalion is limited due to lack of TOE aviation
section. Mobility of the commander and Staff is extremely limited.
Coordination, planning, fire control, accuracy of fires, prevention
of artillery incidents, defense and other items cannot be accomplished
satisfactorily because batteries are so spread that wheel transportation
is not feasible (72 miles by 25 miles) nor safe. It takes two days
of travel by road to reach two batteries. One cannot be reached by
road. With organic aviation section, problems can be prevented rather
tremendous potential of this battalion cannot be reached until the
aviation section is assigned. The command supervision and the experience
of senior staff officers is not available to a battery as it should
i. Item: Artillery
battalion gets little if any surveillance of its missions. When artillery
surveillance is passed by FO's and infantry it goes to the direct
support artillery and not back to the GS or GSR unit. Consequently,
this battalion gets no experience factor on effectiveness of fire
by shell, or fuze or quantity.
surveillance must be disseminated in order that all artillery learn
j. Item: Crater
mortared, units tend to be tied down to preplanned countermortar programs
and in the excitement of action, disregard the importance of crater
analysis to determine as a minimum direction. Also, the enemy is well
aware of the capabilities of countermortar radar and usually plans
his attack so that the countermortar radar is limited.
analysis must be made during or immediately after a mortar attack
to determine direction so that countermortar fire may be effective
and not diluted over a large, unknown area. The first thought in mind
for any countermortar fire must be, "From which azimuth did they
k. Item: Artillery
Firing During Air Strikes
in our experience is always lifted, rather than shifted, during an
airstrike on preplanned targets. And when lifted, lifted as much as
thirty minutes before an airstrike.
should be shifted, not lifted, when an air strike comes in, especially
on "hard" targets. A pause in fire support allows the enemy
time to escape. A shift in fires creates a blocking force by fire.
l. Item: Artillery
and Helicopter Gunships, Same Target at Night.
Discussion: In the
defense of Pleiku, targets are sighted at night. Gunships fly over
these targets and seldom can observe them. They cannot fire unless
they see the target. The artillery battery can fire without seeing
the target if it is cleared. However, the artillery cannot fire because
of gunships in the target area.
should fire first, then the gunships should go in when targets are
clear for firing by artillery.
Part 2. Recommendations
1. (U) Personnel:
2. (U) Operations:
3. (C) Training and
4. (U) Intelligence:
5. (U) Logistics:
6. (U) Other: None
1 Incl LTC,
Organizational Chart Commanding
3 ACSFOR DA
3 DGG USARV
2 CG I FFORCEV
2 CO 52D ARTY GP
1CO 1/92 ARTY
AVGG-OP (3 Aug 67) 1st
Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967
ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96318
TO: Commanding General,
I FFORCEV ARTILLERY, APO 96350
2. Concur with
contents of basic report.
E. FITZPATRICK JR.
AVFA-AT-D (3 August
1967) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 July 1967, (RCS CSFOR-65) (UIC WA2NA) (1st Bn, 92d Arty) (U)
HEADQUARTERS I FIELD
FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY, APO 9635O 28 August 1967
TO: Commanding General,
I Field Force Vietnam, ATT: AVFA-GC-OT, APO 96350
1. Concur in the
observations and recommendations contained in the basic communication.
2. Reference Section
2 part 1 paragraph. Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery
is requesting, by MTOE, that the present authorizations be increased.
3. Reference Section
2 part 1 paragraph 2d. Recommend the XM548 cargo/ammunition vehicle
be field tested to determine the feasibility for its use as a prime
mover for 155mm Howitzer (Towed).
4. Reference Section
2 part 1 paragraph 2h. The commanding officer 1st Bn, 93d Arty will
be advised that the policy established by DA to deploy Combat Support
and Combat Service Support units to RVN with aviation sections at
zero strength, the present DA moratorium on submission of MTOE's for
fill requirements of these units, and the existing shortage of aircraft
preclude action at this level to alleviate the problem. CINCUSARPAC
has recommended that DA review existing criteria for aviation sections
of Combat Support units. Artillery units will be notified when the
DA moratorium has been lifted.
5. 1st Bn, 92d Arty
UIC is WA2NA.
AVFA-GC-OT (3 Aug
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 July 1967, (RCS CSFOR-65) (UIC WA2NA) (1st Bn, 92d Arty) (U)
HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD
FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96350 10
TO: Commanding General,
United States Army Vietnam, APO 96375
Concur with the
recommendation of the basic communications as modified by the 2d Indorsement.
1 Incl 2LT,
AVHGC-DST (3 Aug 67)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31
July 1967, (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)
STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO SAN FRANCISCO 96375
TO: Commander in Chief,
United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558
1. (U) This headquarters
has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending
31 July 1967 from Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery as indorsed.
2. (C) Pertinent
a. Reference item
concerning MOs 13E20; paragraph 1a, page 6, and paragraph 2, 2nd Indorsement.
There is a conflict between paragraph 1a, page 6, which states there
is no need to increase FDC TOE strength and paragraph 2, 2d Indorsement
which states Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam Artillery is requesting,
by MTOE, that the present authorizations be increased. The solution
to the problem is adequately stated in paragraph 1a, page 6.
b. Reference item
concerning maximum utilization of Battalion Staff; paragraph h, page
9 and paragraph 4, 2d Indorsement. Concur with action stated in paragraph
4, 2d Indosement. The moratorium referred to does not influence current
DA policy. Additionally current DA standardization program recognizes
the requirement for aviation sections in artillery units. Copies of
the standardization documents will be provided all concerned when
publication is completed.
3. (U) Unit will
be notified of actions and comments by routine indorsement which returns
FOR THE COMMANDER:
GPOP-DT (3 Aug 67) 5th
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 July
1967 from HQ, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (UIC: WA2NAA)(RCS CSFOR-65)
HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC,
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96558 14
TO: Assistant Chief
of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington,
has evaluated (illegible) report and forwarding indorsements and concurs
in the report as indorsed.
THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
1 Incl MAJ,
1st Battalion, 92d Artillery